Since You Brought It Up

I will apologize up front and tell those who come here for gratuitous references to Eva Longoria or random shots of T&A that you're going to be disappointed with this one. Additionally I wouldn't expect those who aren't Army Aviators to fully understand the full context of what I'm writing...but I would like to get this off my chest.

I was reading a post over at ROFASix concerning the possible shoot-down of three AH-64s in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it dredged up in my mind a bunch of issues about the way Aviation is structured and run in the US Army.

For those who don't know I have been an Army Aviator (that's a pilot to most people) for nearly 20 years. I have no doubt that the things that bother me today have been going on since the Wright Brothers sold the Army its first airplane back at the turn of the last century...but they bother me none the less.

When I attended the Warrant Officer Advanced Course back in 2000, I wrote as part of the course a paper outlining the need for and how to implement building an organization along the lines of the USAF Fighter Weapons School, USN "Top Gun" and the USMC Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS-1). These units not only teach aviators who return to their units to train other aviators on how to fight and win, but they also serve as the clearing house and distributor of lessons learned and development of new Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for the rest of the aviation force.

Over the years (because the Army currently has no similar program for its aviators) various Army units have sent aviators to other services schools (mostly MAWTS-1) to expand their tactical knowledge. The US Army Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL recently formed a Tactics Branch and has begun publishing a Tactics Newsletter...which is a step in the right direction, but not nearly enough.

At the root of the problem, as I see it, is the insistence of the "Army" (I say "Army" because I can't pin this on anyone or even a particular headquarters it's more of a cultural issue as much as I can tell)when we produce TTP or Field Manuals (FM) to write them in a one size fits all mode. For instance if you were to pick up manuals regarding Attack Helicopter operations you will find things like zone reconnaissance or deliberate attack...they are laid out in excruciating detail, some commanders insist that when conducting these operations in training that they be done in exact compliance with these FMs. We've become the Soviet Army!

Actually in reality on the battlefield, aviators do what needs to be done to get the job done. Pilots talk with each other like they have done since the dawn of aviation, pass along what works and what doesn't and the job gets done.

What our manuals should be is like the playbook of an NFL team. A bunch of different plays that can be used, discarded or modified as necessary to facilitate mission completion. There is for some reason a slavish devotion to having everything mapped out second by second from one phase line to the next. Some people believe that if you brief that you are going to patrol a certain sector and it isn't rehearsed and a rock drill done that all hell will break out as soon as you take off. The problem is that the enemy gets a vote, and the second we make contact everything becomes fluid. SO shouldn't we in fact be training on basic plays (as it were) from which all operations can be conducted, and remain flexible?

Finally, we have the issue of people refusing to change or do things the way the other services do them, because we can't do things like the Air Force! Not that it's not a good idea...but because of politics or it's not "Hooah" (I can't begin to express how much I despise that expression) enough. Interestingly enough this comes from Army Aviators not Infantry or Armor Officers (who couldn't care less what we do, as long as we're there for them when they need us). Case in point, upon returning from Iraq in 2004, based on my experiences in theater, I saw a need for my Battalion's aviators to be able to coordinate fixed wing assets (which are on station 24/7 in theater)and utilize their capabilities to synchronize and maximize fires on the objective in support of the ground commander. I saw this need as especially critical given that not all ground battalions in theater has qualified JTACs and the USAF hasn't filled all their ALO billets as required by doctrine. SO we made the case to our chain of command to send some of our aviators to be trained as Forward Air Controllers (Airborne) (FAC(A)). TO make a long story even longer 4 of our pilots came back from MAWTS-1 trained as FAC(A), they were staying current, dong controls with nearby Fixed Wing units...but people at Ft. Rucker didn't like what we did, because, "we don't do CAS (Close Air Support), we do Close Combat Attack." Which misses the point entirely because FAC(A) is about employing assets it isn't about the Air Tasking Order or even about roles and missions. It is about utilizing the assets that were already there, and will be there on the battlefield and synchronizing them to achieve synergistic effects for the commander on the ground...and after all, isn't that what it is all about.

Why is that so difficult for them to understand? Maybe if they would quit worrying about getting flight suits that look like what the ground-pounder is wearing and start thinking about how we can do our jobs better...but what the hell do I know anyway?