Doesn't Anyone Remember Anything?

This POST at Wired Magazine's Danger Room tells the story of the USAF launching a High Speed Anti Radiation Missile (HARM) (it's a missile used to defeat surface to air missile guidance radars) from a drone F-4.

In the article they said:

Armed Predator and Reaper drones have become the primary weapons in the fight against Pakistani militants. But they can be pricey; the Reapers come in at around a hundred million dollars each. Which is why the Air Force is working on a cheaper option: killer zombies.

That reminded me of something I had read a few years ago about the Ryan Firebee family of drones...

Attack and Multimission RPVs: BGM-34A/B/C
In the late 1960s, the Navy studied the possibility to convert the BQM-34A Firebee target drone to a remote-controlled anti-ship missile. In several test flights, BQM-34As equipped with a TV system in the nose, were successfully flown by remote "pilots" watching the TV image. Precision low-level flight above the sea was made possible by the Ryan-developed RALACS (Radar Altimeter Low Altitude Control System). In September 1971, successful tests of Model 248 missiles (called "BQM/SSM") against ship targets showed the validity of the basic concept, but the project was terminated due to lack of funding.

In the same year, the USAF showed interest in a development of the Firebee I to be used for enemy air-defense suppression, because of the high loss rate in these missions. In March 1971, Teledyne Ryan received a contract to convert four Model 147S drones to BGM-34A (Model 234) configuration. Like the Navy's BQM/SSM, the BGM-34A was piloted by an operator watching a TV image transmitted from the drone's nose. In tests during 1971/72, the BGM-34As successfully launched AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface missiles and electro-optically guided glide bombs against simulated SAM sites. Interestingly, almost 30 years later a firing of an AGM-114 Hellfire missile by an MQ-1L Predator UAV was much hyped as a breakthrough in armed UAV technology.

Following the successful BGM-34A tests, Teledyne Ryan developed the BGM-34B (Model 234A) operational strike RPV. This featured the higher-rated J69-T-41A engine, a modified tail, larger control surfaces, and improved operational capabilities. Eight BGM-34Bs were built, and tested in 1973/74. The tests included the modification of some of the drones with a new nose containing a LLLTV (Low Light Level Television) camera and a laser designator, to act as a "pathfinder" for weapon-carrying RPVs.

Yeah, you read that right it said late 1960's and then tested in the early to mid 70's. For those of you scoring at home that's over 30 years ago. The USAF lost interest in UAVs, and drones for much of anything other than targets in the intervening years. And now what's old is new again...only a lot more expensive.

In November 1974, the USAF had three different versions of Firebee combat RPVs in various development states: the AQM-34M reconnaissance drone, the AQM-34V ECM drone, and the BGM-34B strike RPV. It was decided to develop a single multi-mission RPV variant, designated BGM-34C (Teledyne Ryan Model 259), combing the capabilities of the three versions. Five YAQM-34Us were converted to BGM-34Cs, and these were flight-tested between September 1976 and April 1978. There were three exchangable nose sections for the BGM-34C, optimized for the reconnaissance, ECM, and strike roles. Although the tests were considered successful, no funds were approved for follow-on orders for production vehicles. This was at least in part caused by the general view of some Air Force officials, who saw the RPVs as a "competition" to the conventional manned aircraft.

Surprise, surprise. And now here we sit with the USAF saying they can't buy enough planes and the ones they have are too old...with not enough money to go around. Yeah, hindsight is 20/20, but at least some people saw this one coming.

UAVs and Taco Bell

And I thought I was a smart ass.

Check out this story about UAVs

Seems pretty cushy...if blowing terrorists up doesn't make you lose your appetite for the cheesy gordita crunch, that is

Nice snark, a-hole.

And as a matter of fact, I don't loose my appetite, at the end of a mission I was usually pretty hungry. But I didn't fly UAVs...so their experience may vary.

Is that John Cusack at the controls of that Predator?

Bill Sweetman Misses The Point...

At the risk of becoming a USAF bashing machine, I am going to devote some electrons to discussing the UAS/SECDEF/USAF dust-up that happened the other day.

From this post by author Bill Sweetman over at Ares Homepage we get this info...

Sec Def Misses The Point
Posted by Bill Sweetman at 4/22/2008 4:25 AM CDT

Starting a sentence with "Where the SecDef got it wrong..." is not career-enhancing, but as the good Doctor himself said, you have to decide sometimes whether to be somebody or do something.

Dr. Gates' criticisms of the USAF overlooked a crucial issue. Ironically, the limiting factor on Predator operations is not that "the air force doesn't like them because they don't have pilots", to summarize the viewpoint of service and media know-nothings. The problem is that they use too many pilots.

If you talk to anyone at the coal-face of UAV deployment, particularly where the Predator is concerned, you discover that most of these operations are throttle-to-the-firewall. The limiting factor is not the ability of GA-ASI to push airplanes out the door, but training.

If you've ever spent five minutes talking to GA-ASI president Tom Cassidy, you know that the Predator has to be flown by a pilot. The ground control system (GCS) is cockpit-like, with stick and rudder pedals - this is not a mouse-commanded automaton. The backseater needs skills, too, because the Predator is designed to direct lethal force even when it is not using its own weapons; and despite the seeming "war by video game" simplicity of the system, retaining situational awareness despite the soda-straw view through the turreted sensors is not easy...

Yes it isn't easy. Neither is kicking in doors looking for bad guys. Neither is driving on a supply convoy down RT Tampa.

The point the SECDEF was making (the way I understood it) is that the current way of doing things isn't cutting it. Someone needs to come up with a way to get more UAS and their crews up and running.

If that requires changing things then maybe they need to get on with it...there is a war on after all. In WWII somehow or another SGTs flew P-51s and by all accounts did a pretty good job (Some guy named Chuck Yeager was one of them)...I think we might be able to come up with a way to make UAS operators without stealing F-16/A-10/B-52/C-17 pilots away from their day jobs. The USAF could probably do it too, if they wanted to and that is the real problem right there.

USAF Peeved About Drone Debate

Of course this isn't about Drones...it's about UAVs, but there's no alliteration if I had said UAV Debate...oh decisions, decisions. Anyway, some USAF generals have their panties in a bunch...AGAIN.

Christian Lowe has an article describing the whole thing HERE

...The Pentagon's number two official tried to throw cold water on this cat fight, but it seems that the fur is still flying.

On Sept. 13, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England forwarded a memorandum to the service chiefs and top Pentagon officials rejecting a recommendation that the Air Force be the central authority for high and medium-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles.

Air Force brass figured since they do most of the flying these days, the atmosphere - and most everything in it - should be their domain.

But over the last several years the Army has expanded its use of UAVs - particularly medium altitude ones - and they were dead-set against letting their sister service tear control of those assets out of their hands.

What England did was to shift oversight responsibility to the Pentagon, convening a task force that will examine UAV issues and map out a coherent strategy for all the services to develop drone needs, missions and systems, so resources aren't wasted and there's better coordination.

But that doesn't sit well with some top Air Force commanders who see this as more of the same...

Best quote of the whole thing by GEN "Buzz" Mosely (never trust anyone who calls himself "Buzz")...

"This is a recognition of the environment that we have identified as Airmen because this battlespace is something we are very familiar with,"

Is that even English? I trust this reporter to have taken the entire statement as spoken and transcribed it correctly...I know this is a great leap of faith, but it's all I've got, work with me.

It also reeks of a line that a pompous ass character actor from a movie out of the thirties might have said, complete with dramatic throat clearing and harrumphs for good measure. (Pompous British accent on) (dramatic throat clearing) Yes, you see young man, we alone can understand the full nature of operating in the air because as airmen we travel through the air and understand it perfectly, something non airmen will never be able to figure out because as you can see we are airmen...HARRUMPH...(Pompus British accent off).

Yeah, whatever. If you (USAF) did your frickin jobs and gave people (ARMY) what they needed, they wouldn't be spending money, money that could easily be used elsewhere, to buy stuff (UAV) that you have...but that would require serious self critique...and we can't be the ones with the problem...it's THEM...it's always someone else isn't it?

As those twelve step people like to say, the first step to recovery is to admit that you have a problem.

Now They Are After The UAVs

Courtesy of former Marine, W. Thomas Smith Jr. over at The Tank comes a link to an article published in the "Army Enquirer" the "Military Times" chain of news papers that includes The Marine Corps Times. Written by a 32 year USAF veteran Charles Sutherland, the article entitled "Function Comes First" details why the author believes that blue suiters should control all UAV operations. He says in part...

Following the Vietnam War, there was a debate in Congress about attack helicopters and whether the Army’s procurement of them represented a duplication of the Air Force’s requirement to organize, train, equip and provide forces for close-air support...

...the Army’s argument for acquiring a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles and a bank of operators to control them is going strong. The Air Force’s counter-argument, which uses an altitude restriction as a defining point, has missed the target.

Suggesting that UAVs operating above 3,500 feet should be organized, trained, equipped and provided by the Air Force implies that UAVs operating below 3,500 feet are open for any service wanting to make the investment. Jones and Weyand did not mention altitude in their 1975 debate. Instead, they concentrated on the function of the platform as they reached resolution. Likewise, the Air Force’s UAV argument needs to be based on functionality and requirements...

He then details that the US Army has 1 Billion US dollars to spend on UAVs and how this money should be given over to the USAF, who should control all UAVs based on their charter to provide TAC reece etc.

Having served in Army aviation for over 20 years now I can assure Mr. Sutherland that if the USAF would have fullfiled it's role as a provider of TAC recon and other things CAS over the years there wouldn't have been the need for the Key West agreement or a fight over UAV. I can assure you that the powers that be in the head shed in Washington than run the Green Machine would much rather spend their money on new rifles, MRAPs and tanks than they would on UAVs and/or helicopters. They spend it on UAVs and helicopters because they aren't getting what they need from the USAF.

The altitude of 3500 feet that the author harps about is roughly equivilant to the coordinating altitude. You see the airspace above the battlefield is divided up so we can keep things that fly though the air from running into one another. the coordinating altitude is the altitude that essentially divides the owning ground unit from the USAF and other "fast movers"...although there are exceptions like MLRS that cross the coordinating altitude, that is generally the cut off between things that beat the air into submission and things that fly really fast. It's called doctrine...look it up.

So does the author suggest that we do away with coordinating altitudes altogether? I doubt it...I think he just believes that the USAF should control all UAVs. In a shrinking USAF, I don't see how if they took control of all UAS that they (the USAF) would be able to meet demand, but if you look at the way they handle CAS that's not their problem it's the Army's problem...and that's why we have attack helicopters. The USAF can't provide enough TACP's to control CAS for every unit in the field...and that's not their problem it just means the Army doesn't get CAS when and where it needs it. Especially since they won't let Army aviators clear CAS platforms hot on a target. Where are the operators going to come from if they (USAF) took control of every Raven, Shadow and I-Gnat that the Army currently operates? They don't care they just want control...not results. And over here I can assure you it's the results that matter not the color of the suit one wears at the party at the O-Club.

Yeah, function does come first...and that is exactly why the USAF doesn't need to control all UAS.